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Abstract
In this article, we introduce a novel deception strategy which is inspired by the “Borrowing Arrows with
Thatched Boats”, one of the most famous military tactics in the history, in order to defeat reactive jamming attacks
for low-power IoT networks. Our proposed strategy allows resource-constrained IoT devices to be able to defeat
powerful reactive jammers by leveraging their own jamming signals. More specifically, by stimulating the jammer
to attack the channel through transmitting fake transmissions, the IoT system can not only undermine the jammer’s
power, but also harvest energy or utilize jamming signals as a communication means to transmit data through using
RF energy harvesting and ambient backscatter techniques, respectively. Furthermore, we develop a low-cost deep
reinforcement learning framework that enables the hardware-constrained IoT device to quickly obtain an optimal
defense policy without requiring any information about the jammer in advance. Simulation results reveal that our
proposed framework can not only be very effective in defeating reactive jamming attacks, but also leverage jammer’s
power to enhance system performance for the IoT network.
Index Terms
IoT, jamming, ambient backscatter, RF energy harvesting, deception, MDP, and deep reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 10 years, we have witnessed an explosive growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications
with great influences in many sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare, smart cities, and industry
4.0 [1]. The development of IoT has brought great benefits to human life and opened many potential
market opportunities for equipment manufacturers, Internet service providers and application developers.
According to IDC’s prediction, worldwide technology spending on the IoT can reach $1.2T in 2022,
attaining a compound annual growth rate of 13.6% over the 2017-2022 forecast period1. Furthermore, it
1IDC Forecasts Worldwide Technology Spending on the Internet of Things to Reach $1.2 Trillion in 2022
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2is also estimated that around 500 billion devices will be connected to the Internet by 20302. Obviously,
with outstanding advantages and benefits, IoT has been becoming an indispensable part of human life in
the near future.
Despite the explosive growth, IoT is extremely vulnerable to security threats, especially jamming
attacks, due to hardware constraints and the broadcast nature of wireless communications. In particular, by
transmitting high-power jamming signals to a target channel, a jammer can degrade Signal-to-Interference-
plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at the IoT receiver, e.g., an IoT gateway. Consequently, the IoT receiver is unable
to decode information from the IoT transmitter. More importantly, radio jamming attacks can be easily
launched by using commercial off-the-shelf products3, and thus they can cause serious consequences
to human life, especially in mission-critical sectors such as healthcare, military, and transportation. For
example, an attacker used a cheap jamming device to perform a car lock jamming attack, with the intent
of breaking into vehicles, caused chaos in a parking lot where nobody could unlock/lock their remote car
locks and ended up triggering the number of alarms in the process [2]. As a result, solutions to deal with
jamming attacks are of urgent needs for future development of IoT networks.
In this paper, we first give an overview about communication methods and potential vulnerabilities
to jamming attacks in IoT networks. We then review emerging wireless jamming techniques and current
effective countermeasures to defeat jamming attacks. After that, we develop a novel anti-jamming strategy
which allows resource-constrained IoT devices to effectively to defeat powerful reactive jammers. Our
proposed strategy is inspired by a famous deception military tactic, called Borrowing Arrows with Thatched
Boats4, which utilizes the enemy’s power to defeat the enemy itself. In particular, considering an IoT
system under jamming attacks by a reactive jammer, the IoT transmitter can perform deception strategies
by sending fake transmissions to its receiver to stimulate the jammer to attack the channel. Once the
jammer attacks the channel, the IoT transmitter can immediately harvest energy from jamming signals or
leverage the jamming signals as a communication means to transmit data to its receiver by using ambient
backscatter techniques [3]. In this way, we can not only undermine the jammer’s power, but also utilize the
jammer as an additional energy source to improve performance for the IoT system. In addition, a low-cost
deep reinforcement learning (DRL) algorithm is developed to quickly obtain an optimal deception policy
of the anti-jamming strategy for the IoT system without requiring any information about the jammer in
advance. The simulation results then clearly show the efficiency of our proposed framework in terms of
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3higher throughput and lower dropped packets in dealing with reactive jamming attacks.
II. COMMUNICATIONS IN IOT NETWORKS AND VULNERABILITIES TO JAMMING ATTACKS
A. IoT Communication Protocols: A Brief Overview
In order to connect billions of smart devices to the Internet, wireless communications have been widely
adopted as the most effective communication medium in IoT networks. In practice, typical communication
protocols used in IoT networks are WiFi, Bluetooth, IEEE 802.15.4, Z-wave, and LTE-Advanced [1].
Furthermore, there are some other wireless communications technologies introduced recently for IoT
networks such as Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID), Near Field Communication (NFC), Narrowband
IoT (NB-IoT) and Long Range (LoRa). Each protocol possesses its own advantages as well as limitations,
and usually it is designed to serve for a particular type of IoT applications. For example, IEEE 802.15.4
protocol is usually used for indoor ultra-low power IoT communication applications, while LTE-Advanced
protocol is typically implemented for outdoor low-latency IoT communication applications.
B. Vulnerabilities of IoT Communications to Jamming Attacks
In practice, IoT networks are allocated to some particular channels for communications. For example,
according to the newest IEEE communication standard for low-rate networks released in 2017, there are
still only 16 channels allocated for all IoT devices using the IEEE 802.15.4 communication protocol in
2.4GHz band (2400-2483MHz)5. In addition, due to hardware constraints and power supply limitations,
transmit powers of IoT devices are usually kept at very low levels. For example, IoT devices using
IEEE 802.15.4 communication protocol usually have transmit powers at approximately 0 dBm [4]. These
characteristics, i.e., the limited number of communication channels and low transmit power, are especially
susceptible to jamming attacks. In particular, an attacker can easily determine a target IoT communication
channel, and then transmit high-power jamming signals to prevent communications on the channel. As
a result, the IoT receiver cannot successfully decode information from the IoT transmitter due to very
low SINR. More importantly, conventional security methods, e.g., encryption, cannot be used to defeat
jamming attacks.
C. Radio Jamming Attacks in IoT Networks
A radio jamming attack is a method in which a jammer intentionally transmits strong radio jamming
signals to the target channel to illegally interrupt IoT communications by decreasing the SINR at the
5IEEE Standard 802.11.4tTM-2017.
4IoT receiver. In the past, radio jamming attack is one of the most common technology methods used
during World War II to interfere radar operations used to guide enemies’ missiles/aircrafts or prevent
citizens from listening foreign radio stations broadcast by enemies. In the modern life, radio jamming
attacks are more and more dangerous as they can be maliciously used not only in military but also civil
applications. In particular, with the explosion of IoT applications in many areas in our life, e.g., smart
home, manufacturing, healthcare, and transportation, jamming attacks can cause damages to IoT systems,
leading to serious adverse impacts to the human life. For example, an attacker could easily disable the
smart home wireless alarm system by using a commercial portal jamming device to prevent the IoT
devices from sending alarm messages to the server and/or the home owner. More importantly, in some
sensitive IoT applications, e.g., brain and heart implanted IoT devices, jamming attacks can cause serious
consequences for human health. Therefore, it is an urgent call for countermeasures to defeat jamming
attacks in IoT networks.
There are some typical methods used in radio jamming attacks [5].
• Constant jamming: A jammer continuously emits meaningless noise signals on the target channel
without following any standard protocol.
• Deceptive jamming: A jammer continuously transmits regular packets to the channel instead of
emitting random bits as the constant jamming attack, to make the victim to believe that a legitimate
device is transmitting.
• Random jamming: A jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming modes to save energy. In the
jamming mode, the jammer can perform either constant or deceptive jamming attacks.
• Reactive jamming: A jammer listens the target channel and transmits jamming signals (either constant
or deceptive signals) to the channel once it detects activities of the victim on the channel.
Among radio jamming methods, reactive jamming is the most effective and serious attack in IoT
networks as it can “smartly” detect and launch attacks only when the IoT system is active. Furthermore,
it is more difficult to detect a reactive jamming than a proactive jamming, e.g., constant and deceptive
jamming, because it is only active when the IoT transmitter is transmitting, and thus a detector might not
be able to distinguish whether signals on the channel are from the IoT transmitter or from a jammer. More
seriously, reactive jamming devices can be developed easily by integrating compact signal-detection circuits
on conventional jamming devices. Many commercial reactive jamming devices have been developing for
military and civil purposes, e.g., Roshel (www.roshel.ca) and TJ Infotech (www.tjinfotech.net), and this
makes defeating jamming attacks in IoT networks more challenging than ever.
5III. SOLUTIONS TO DEFEAT RADIO JAMMING ATTACKS IN IOT NETWORKS
A. Frequency-Hopping
This is one of the most common methods used to deal with radio jamming attacks. The key idea of this
method is that if the current communication channel is attacked, the IoT devices will find another channel
that is not being attacked for communication. This solution is effective to defeat proactive jamming attacks
as the IoT devices have information about channels under being attacks in advance. However, this solution
requires a set of available communication channels, which are an expensive and scarce resource, together
with the a predefined, but preferably adaptive channel-switching algorithm implemented on all the IoT
devices in advance. As a result, this solution might not be effective to widely implement on hardware-
constrained and channel-limited IoT communication systems. In addition, this solution cannot deal with
reactive jamming attacks in which the jammers only launch attacks after the IoT devices transmit signals.
B. Rate Adaptation
Rate adaptation is also an anti-jamming method which can be effectively implemented in IoT networks
to defeat proactive jamming attacks. For this method, when a channel is under a proactive jamming attack,
the IoT transmitter will observe the channel status and determine an appropriate transmission rate such that
the IoT receiver still can decode information under the jamming attack. This method can be implemented
on a hardware-constrained IoT device as the IoT device only needs to control its data transmission rate,
typically at a low rate, when the attack occurs. However, this method does not work well if the jammer
always attacks the channel at high power levels. In addition, similar to the frequency-hopping approach,
this method cannot deal with reactive jammers since they only attack the channel after detecting signals
of the IoT transmitter on the channel.
C. Ambient Backscatter
Thanks to the development of backscatter communication techniques, there is a new anti-jamming
approach introduced recently [6]. This approach is developed based on the idea of recent advanced ambient
backscatter communication technologies [7] [8]. Specifically, in an ambient backscatter communication
system, a transmitter can transmit data to its receiver by backscattering surrounding RF signals, e.g., TV
or FM signals, to its receiver. The receiver then can decode the information by using some low-cost
decoding techniques, e.g., averaging mechanisms [7]. Inspired by this idea, the authors in [6] proposed
a solution utilizing jamming signals as a “means” to delivery data for IoT communication systems. In
6particular, when a jammer transmits jamming signals to the channel, the IoT transmitter can leverage the
jamming signals to backscatter and transmit information to the IoT receiver. In this way, the IoT system
can not only avoid the jamming attacks, but also utilize the jamming signals for its transmissions. As a
result, this approach is very effective in dealing with jamming attacks in IoT networks. However, similar
to all aforementioned methods, this approach still fails to defeat the reactive jamming attacks. The reason
is that this approach is based on jamming signals; however, for reactive jammers, they only attack the
channel if they detect signals transmitted by the IoT device on the channel.
In practice, reactive jamming is the most difficult attack to deal with especially in low-power IoT
networks. Some solutions were proposed to combat reactive jamming attacks such as [9], [10], but they
all rely on the assumptions that there are multiple communication channels and jammers cannot attack all
the channels simultaneously. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no effective solution to deal with
reactive jamming attacks, and this is the motivation for us to introduce DeepQFake, a novel framework
to defeat jamming attacks in IoT networks.
IV. DEEPQFAKE: A DRL-BASED DECEPTION STRATEGY TO DEFEAT REACTIVE JAMMING ATTACKS
A. Deception Strategy to Defeat Reactive Jamming Attacks
1) Functions and components of the IoT system: In this paper, we consider an IoT communication
system including a low-power IoT device and an IoT gateway. The IoT device is equipped with a storage
to store data and a battery to store energy. The energy stored in the battery will be used to transmit
data in the storage to the IoT gateway. As a low-power device, the IoT device is equipped with an RF
energy harvesting circuit and an ambient backscatter circuit. The energy harvesting circuit is used to
harvest energy from surrounding environment and store the harvested energy in the battery. Meanwhile,
the ambient backscatter circuit is used in the case when the IoT device wants to transmit data to the
gateway based on the ambient backscatter technique. Both circuits share the same antenna and are under
control by a microcontroller as illustrated in Fig. 1. In practice, energy harvesting and ambient backscatter
circuits are tiny and consume a small amount of energy which are especially suitable to implement on
the low-power IoT device. For example, RFD102A (RF-DC Converter) module has the size of only
5mm×7mm×1.8mm, and its energy harvesting efficiency can reach up to 50%. Furthermore, ADG902
RF switch used in ambient backscatter circuit is even smaller than RFD102A, and its energy consumption
for backscatter mode is very small with only 0.25µW. More details about components and functions of
energy harvesting and ambient backscatter circuits can be found in [7], [3].
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Fig. 1: Circuit diagram of the low-power IoT system.
There are three main functions on the IoT device as shown in Fig. 1. First, the IoT device can use the
ambient backscatter circuit to transmit data to the gateway by backscattering surrounding RF signals. In
this case, the gateway will use corresponding backscatter demodulator circuit, e.g., a low-cost averaging
circuit [7], to decode and extract information. Second, the IoT device can actively transmit data to the
gateway by using energy in the battery. In this case, the gateway can use the conventional demodulator
to decode information. Finally, the third function is to harvest energy from surrounding environment. It
is important to note that only one function can be performed at a time due to single antenna usage. Thus,
energy and communication need to be optimized to maximize the network throughput for IoT system [3].
2) Reactive jammer and intelligent deception strategy: In this work, we consider a smart and reactive
jammer which only attacks the channel if it detects signals transmitted from the IoT transmitter. The
jammer is equipped with a detector circuit, e.g., matched filter or energy detector, to detect activities
of the IoT device on the channel. This circuit will listen to the channel and identify whether the signal
on the channel is from the IoT device or not. If the signal is determined from the IoT transmitter and
if the jammer has sufficient energy to launch an attack, the jammer will immediately transmit jamming
signals at high power to the channel as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). The aim of jammer is to significantly
increase the noise at the gateway, thereby preventing the gateway from successfully decoding information
from the IoT device. In the case if the IoT device actively transmits data and the jammer does not have
sufficient energy to launch an attack, then the IoT gateway can successfully decode information from the
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Fig. 2: System model.
IoT transmitter as illustrated in Fig. 2(a).
In practice, the jammer’s energy is much stronger than that of IoT device, and thus the jammer can
attack and prevent all communications from the IoT device. To deal with reactive and strong jamming
attacks, we introduce an intelligent deception strategy for the IoT system. In particular, instead of always
performing actual transmissions, the IoT device can “sometimes” send “fake” transmissions to lure the
jammer. A fake transmission is defined to be a deception strategy in which the IoT device only transmits
signals for a short period of time to attract the jammer. By using the deception mechanism, we can
undermine the attack ability of jammer, and thus the jammer may not be able to attack when the IoT
device performs actual transmissions. More importantly, by luring the jammer to transmit jamming signals,
the IoT device can utilize these signals to enhance its energy and communication efficiency. Specifically,
when the IoT device performs a fake transmission and the jammer attacks the channel, we introduce two
9intelligent mechanisms to “exploit” jamming signals as follows:
• Deception then harvest energy: For this scheme, the IoT device transmits signals on the channel
for a short period of time at the beginning of a time slot. Then, if the jammer performs jamming
attacks, the IoT device will harvest energy from jamming signals until the jammer stops jamming.
This scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2(c).
• Deception then backscatter data: Similar to the previous deception scheme, the IoT device also
transmits signals for a short period of time at the beginning of a time slot to lure the jammer.
Then, if the jammer performs jamming attacks, the IoT device will leverage the jamming signals to
backscatter data to the gateway. This scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2(d).
It can be clearly seen that the proposed deception strategies are very effective to deal with reactive
jamming attacks. First, the energy harvesting function is especially useful for the low-power IoT device in
harvesting energy not only from surrounding environment but also from jamming signals. The harvested
energy will be used to transmit data to the gateway and support operations at the IoT device. Similarly,
ambient backscatter function is also very useful in supporting free-cost data transmission for the IoT
device by reflecting RF signals from surrounding environment or jamming signals. In [7], the authors
show that ambient backscatter can be used for the communications between two bateryless IoT devices.
More interestingly, these two functions are even more effective under strong jamming attacks. Intuitively,
the more power the jammer uses to attack the channel, the larger amount of energy the IoT device can
harvest and the more bits the IoT system can successfully backscatter. These results have been verified
based on information theoretic approaches as well as many experiments as shown in the recent survey [3].
Although the aforementioned deception strategies clearly benefit the IoT system in dealing with reactive
jamming attacks, they can only perform best when they have some information about the jammer in
advance. For example, given the jamming signal on the channel, the IoT device should harvest energy
or perform an ambient backscatter transmission from the jamming signal? In addition, how to optimize
energy harvesting, active transmission, and backscatter transmission processes without knowing jammer’s
capacity, e.g., frequency and power of attacks, in advance? The jammer is a malicious device which is
used to prevent IoT communications, and thus its information is nearly impossible to obtain in advance.
Therefore, to deal with the challenges in finding the optimal deception strategy for the IoT device without
requiring the knowledge about the jammer in advance, in the next section, we introduce DeepQFake, a
DRL-based deception framework. This framework allows the IoT device to learn the jammer’s strategy
through real-time interactions.
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B. DeepQFake: A DRL-based Deception Strategy
1) Reinforcement Learning: Reinforcement learning is one of important branches of machine learning
which has been widely implemented in practice for real-time decision making problems when agents, e.g.,
IoT devices, do not have sufficient information about its surrounding environment. In a reinforcement
learning process, an agent interacts with its surrounding environment through trial-and-error processes,
i.e., making decisions and observing results, then gradually it can learn the characteristics of environment
and make “intelligent” decisions to maximize its long-term reward as illustrated in Fig. 3(a). As a result,
reinforcement learning has been successfully applied in many critical sectors such as robotics, economic,
artificial intelligent (AI), and manufacturing [12]. Thus, this is motivation for us to introduce an application
of reinforcement learning to help the IoT device (i.e., the agent) to learn characteristics of jammer (i.e.,
surrounding environment) in order to maximize the average throughput of IoT system (i.e., long-term
reward) without requiring the jammer’s information (e.g., frequency and power of attacks) in advance.
In order to maximize efficiency of the learning process, the first important step is to determine appro-
priate states, actions, and rewards for the IoT system. In the considered system, we aim to maximize the
long-term throughput for IoT system, and thus the reward of learning process can be defined to be the
average IoT system throughput. In addition, to achieve this objective, the IoT device needs to determine
the best action to perform at each time slot. There are four possible actions, i.e., IoT operation modes,
for the IoT device to choose from at each time slot.
• Passive Energy Harvesting: In this mode, the IoT device listens the channel and harvests energy from
surrounding RF signals if available. This mode is used when the IoT device has no data to transmit
or no energy for active transmissions.
• Active Transmission: In this mode, the IoT device proactively uses its energy to transmit data to
the gateway. This mode is the basic communication function of almost all current IoT devices. The
advantage of this mode is easy to implement and efficient in transmitting the number of packets to
the gateway as illustrated in Fig. 2(a). However, if a jamming attack is launched when the IoT device
uses this mode, all packets will be corrupted as illustrated in Fig. 2(b).
• Active Deception and Energy Harvesting: This mode allows the IoT device to perform a fake
transmission to lure the jammer. Then, if the jammer attacks the channel, the IoT device will actively
harvest energy from the jamming signals as illustrated in Fig. 2(c).
• Active Deception and Information Backscattering: This mode allows the IoT to perform a deception
transmission to lure the jammer. Then, if the jammer attacks the channel, the IoT device will actively
11
backscatter the jamming signals to transmit data to the gateway as illustrated in Fig. 2(d).
Note that, in the case that the IoT device performs a fake transmission, but the jammer does not attack
the channel, the IoT device will then switch to the passive energy harvesting mode in the rest of time slot
to save energy. In addition, it can be observed that the deception strategy is not always the best choice for
the IoT device to perform as its efficiency depends largely on the IoT device’s capacity, e.g., the current
number of packets and energy levels. Thus, there are two critical factors which need to be defined in the
state space for the IoT system, i.e., the energy levels in the battery and the number of packets waiting
in the data buffer. Based on its current states, the IoT device can choose one possible action, observe its
immediate result, and then continue improving its optimal policy through learning from its decisions. In
reinforcement learning, Q-learning is the most effective method and widely adopted in the literature. The
key idea of Q-learning method is using a Q-table to store all pairs of state-action values. Then, through
the trial-and-error processes, the Q-values will be updated and it is proved in [12] that if the agent has
sufficient time to learn, the Q-values will finally converge to the optimal values. In other words, the IoT
device will obtain the optimal policy, i.e., the policy which shows the best action to take give the current
state, through this learning process.
It is also important to note that for reactive jamming attacks, the jammer only attacks the channel after
the IoT makes an active transmission (either fake or actual transmission), and thus the channel status
cannot be used as a decision factor in the state space (as the channel is always idle at the beginning of
a time slot). As a result, given only local information, i.e.,the number of packets and energy levels, it
may take very long time for the IoT device to obtain the optimal policy through trial-and-error processes.
Thus, in the next section, we introduce a state-of-the-art technique, called DRL, which can obtain the
optimal policy much faster than the conventional reinforcement learning method. This makes our proposed
anti-jamming framework much more reliable and efficient to implement in practice.
2) Deep Reinforcement Learning: Recently, DRL has been emerging to be an enabling AI technology
which can overcome limitations of reinforcement learning algorithms and making applications of rein-
forcement learning more and more efficiency in practice [13], [11]. The key idea of DRL is utilizing
the advantage of deep artificial neural networks (DNN) to significantly improve the learning speed of
trail-and-error processes. In particular, instead of making decisions based on the Q-values in the Q-table
as in reinforcement learning, the agent in DRL uses a DNN to make decisions as illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
A DNN is composed by an input layer, an output layer, and several hidden layers. Each layer has many
neurons and the connection between two neurons is called weight. Then, if a state is sent to the DNN,
12
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Fig. 3: Illustrations of (a) Reinforcement learning, (b) Deep reinforcement learning, and (c) Proposed
two-module DRL framework for the low-power IoT system.
features of the state will be extracted (e.g., the energy level and the number of packets waiting in the data
buffer) and fed to the input layer. After that, based on values of weights, the DNN can find the optimal
value, i.e., the best action for the IoT device to take, at the output layer.
Theoretically, reinforcement learning and DRL are similar because both of them use the same procedure,
i.e., make a decision and then learn from results obtained from this decision. However, the key difference
between reinforcement learning and DRL is at the way they train their models. Specifically, for a
reinforcement learning process, each experience (defined to be a set of the current state, the action selected
at this state, the reward received at this state after the action is executed, and the next state of the system)
is learned only one time. This means that the decision policy of agent is updated immediately once an
experience is generated and this experience might not be used in the future to update the decision policy.
However, for the DRL, experiences will be stored in an experience pool and they will be combined
randomly to train the DNN many times. In this case, the DNN can learn from a large set of different
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scenarios, and thus the learning quality is much better than that of the conventional reinforcement learning.
Obviously, training processes are the key factors for DRL to significantly outperform conventional
reinforcement learning algorithms, but they come with intensive computing costs. As a result, DRL
algorithms might not be practically implemented on low-power devices, e.g., the IoT device considered in
this paper. Therefore, we introduce a two-module DRL framework which can be efficiently implemented
on the low-power IoT system. The first module, called online module, is implemented on the IoT device.
This module includes two main components, i.e., an experience pool and a DNN as illustrated in Fig. 3(c).
The DDN is used to help the IoT to choose the best action to take given the current state. The experiment
pool is used to store all experiences which the IoT device obtains during the interaction process with the
jammer. Experiences in the experience pool will be periodically, e.g., after every new 1000 experiences,
sent to a resourceful device, e.g., the IoT gateway or a nearby computer, to train the DNN. After the
DNN is trained, the newly updated model will be sent to the IoT device for updating the local model. In
this way, all training processes are “offloaded” to the resourceful devices, and the IoT device only needs
to run simple low-cost tasks during the real-time interaction with the jammer.
C. Simulation Results
In this section, we carry out simulations to evaluate the performance of our proposed DRL-based
deception strategy framework to defeat reactive jamming attacks. We set the maximum data queue size
and battery levels at 10 units. In particular, the battery can store up to 10 units of energy with each
energy unit set to be 60µJ [14], and the data buffer can store up to 10 packets with each packet size set
to be 300 bits [15]. At each time slot, the IoT device can choose to perform a fake transmission or an
actual transmission which consumes one or three units of energy, respectively. If the IoT device chooses
to perform an actual transmission and there is no attack on the channel, the IoT can successfully transmit
three packets to the gateway. However, if the jammer attacks the channel, then all packets will be dropped.
If the IoT device performs a fake transmission and the jammer attacks the channel, the IoT device can
harvest three units of energy or backscatter one packet to the gateway. In addition, at each time slot, it is
assumed that there are two packets generated at the IoT device with probability 0.5, and the IoT device
can harvest one unit of energy from surrounding environment with probability 0.3. The jammer attack and
packet arrival probabilities will be varied to evaluate the influence of the jammer and IoT device to the
system, respectively. Parameters of DNN are adopted from general settings in the literature [13], [11], e.g.,
two fully-connected hidden layers with 200 neurons per layer. In addition, to evaluate the efficiency of
the proposed deception mechanism taking both energy harvesting and backscattering into considerations,
14
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Fig. 4: Vary jamming attack probability.
we compare with three other strategies: (1) Deception then Backscatter (DB), (2) Deception then Harvest
Energy (DH), and (3) Without Deception (WD). To make fair comparisons, for the first two strategies,
their optimal policies are also obtained by the DRL. For the last strategy, i.e., WD, the IoT device will
transmit data as long as it has data and sufficient energy.
First, we increase the probability of attacks (per time slot) from 0.1 to 0.9 and evaluate the performance
of IoT system in terms of the average throughput and dropped packets under different anti-jamming
strategies. As observed in Fig. 4(a), as the frequency of attacks increases from 0.1 to 0.3, the average
throughput obtained by the proposed framework slightly drops from 0.28 to 0.21. However, interestingly,
if we keep increasing the probability of the attack from 0.3 to 0.9, the average throughput gradually
increases from 0.21 to 0.31 before soaring to 0.67 when the probability of attacks is at 0.9. The reason
is that if the jammer often attacks the channel, it will unintentionally supply an abundant and strong
RF signal resource for the IoT device. As a result, the IoT device can utilize such signals to enhance
the performance for IoT system. Compared with other deception strategies, our proposed solution can
simultaneously optimize backscattering, energy harvesting, and active transmissions, and thus it always
achieves the best performance. In addition, it can be observed that without using the deception strategy,
the throughput of IoT system will be dropped quickly as the probability of attacks increases.
In Fig. 5, we fix the probability of jamming attacks at 0.6 and vary the packet arrival probability to
evaluate the IoT system performance. As the packet arrival probability increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the
system throughput obtained by the proposed solution surges nearly 75%, from 0.2 to 0.35. Nevertheless,
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Fig. 5: Vary packet arrival probability.
if we keep increasing the packet arrival probability, the system throughput only slightly increases because
it reaches the saturation state, i.e., the IoT system cannot improve its performance given the current system
setting. At the saturation point, the average throughput obtained by the proposed solution can achieve 6%,
94%, and 170% greater than that of the DH, DB, and WD, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced the novel anti-jamming framework for the low-power IoT system.
This framework is developed based on the intelligent deception strategy and the low-cost DRL framework.
The proposed deception strategy is a groundbreaking solution in dealing with reactive jamming attacks,
meanwhile the proposed two-module DRL is an AI-based effective learning tool to quickly find an
optimal defense policy for the IoT system given the incomplete information from the jammer and the
dynamic of the wireless environment. Through simulations, we have clearly shown the efficiency as well
as outperformance of proposed framework compared with other anti-jamming strategies.
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